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ABSTRACT 
Social botnets have become an important phenomenon 
on social media. There are many ways in which social 
bots can disrupt or influence online discourse, such as, 
spam hashtags, scam twitter users, and astroturfing. In 
this paper we considered one specific social botnet in 
Twitter to understand how it grows over time, how the 
content of tweets by the social botnet differ from regular 
users in the same dataset, and lastly, how the social 
botnet may have influenced the relevant discussions. 
Our analysis is based on a qualitative coding for 
approximately 3000 tweets in Arabic and English from 
the Syrian social bot that was active for 35 weeks on 
Twitter before it was shutdown. We find that the growth, 
behavior and content of this particular botnet did not 
specifically align with common conceptions of botnets. 
Further we identify interesting aspects of the botnet that 
distinguish it from regular users. 
Author Keywords 
Bots; Botnet; Automated Social Actor; Twitter; Social 
Computing; Arab Spring 
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H5.m. Information interfaces and presentation (e.g., 
HCI): Miscellaneous.  
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INTRODUCTION 
During the past two years, Laila has been interested in 
the Syrian uprising. Laila is studying political science 
and her Arabic is a little rusty, but good enough to search 
and read tweets. Over time she has observed users who 
tweet in support of the Syrian government and others 
who tweet in favor of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Laila 
has noticed that users who tweet from a given 
perspective will share common followers and will 
retweet each other. 
Today, one particular tweet catches Laila’s eye. The 
tweet looks like a news headline favorable to the Syrian 
government. Laila clicks a shortened URL in the tweet 
and finds herself on a news website that is known to be 
backed by the Syrian government. Laila suspects this 
information might be biased and returns to Twitter to 
search again. In the results of her search, she notices that 
the tweet has now been retweeted thousands of times. 
Laila thinks to herself, “Who are these people?” and 
wonders why this tweet is so special. She traces the topic 
to uncover the originator of the tweet. The profile for the 
account is sparse, with few details about the user. 
Online social spaces often challenge users’ abilities to 
understand others, interpret their actions and 
collaborate. This challenge is not particularly new. 
However, what is a new and growing challenge is that 
we can no longer assume that a social space is populated 
exclusively by people. Bots have become significant 
players in online social spaces. A recent study estimated 
that 61.5% of total web traffic comes from bots. One 
recent study of Twitter revealed that bots make for 32% 
of the Twitter posts generated by the most active account 
[5]. In the future, more and more of the social 
interpretations that we will be challenged to make will 
be about collections of people interleaved with 
collections of machines acting like people. In the context 
of CSCW it is essential for designers and researchers to 
anticipate and design for the interactions among bots 
and human participants to improve the potential 
collaborations. 
This study considers one specific social botnet in 
Twitter to understand how it grows over time, how the 
content of tweets by the social botnet differ from regular 
users in the same dataset, and lastly, how the social 
botnet may have influenced the relevant discussions. 
Our botnet data comes from a much larger corpus of 
tweets focused on the Syrian civil war. The botnet 
emerged from an unrelated set of social network 
explorations where we were considering the structural 
properties of tweeting and retweeting around specific 
events of the Syrian civil war. Our analysis follows the 
botnet comprised of 130 user accounts, from the earliest 
evidence we have of its existence through the 35 weeks 
it was active, up to the day that Twitter suspended the 
botnet. 
In the following we first define a social botnet and cover 
the prior research related to studies of social bots and 
botnets. Next, we describe the dataset of tweets in which 
the Syrian social botnet (SSB) was discovered. We then 
describe three analyses we conducted on the data set; (i) 
growth of the Syrian social botnet over time, (ii) a 
grounded content analysis of botnet and regular user 
tweets, and (iii) the potential influence that the botnet 
had within the context of the data set. 
BOTS AS SOCIAL ACTORS 
A bot is software designed to automate a task in a 
computing system. The popularity of bots has risen over 
the last few years with the rise of web services that 
simplify programmatic interactions with a wider range 
of web based resources and a growing corpus of code 
libraries that implement the onerous, repetitive aspects 
of accessing a web service. 
We characterize a social bot as an automated social 
actor (ASA). This is software designed to act in ways 
that are similar to how a person might act in the social 
space. The level of sophistication and the roles that a 
given ASA will fill in the social space can vary. An ASA 
could be relatively simple, like bots that aggregate 
information from web news and re-present it as a set of 
tweets in Twitter, or quite sophisticated like a 
conversational bot that is attempting to pass a Turing 
test. An ASA can be malicious by trying to disrupt a 
social space, or the ASA can try to augment and support 
a social space, say by explaining different cultural 
norms. An ASA becomes more interesting when it 
attempts to presents itself as an actual person in a social 
space. That is, when ASAs attempt to pass as an actual 
person, goals, motivations, and mechanisms behind the 
bot are interesting to uncover, unpack and understand. 
One danger of ASAs is passing as a person or 
organization to promote specific ideologies to create a 
false sense of consensus. 
Our definition draws a subtle distinction between ASAs 
and the way “botnet” has been predominantly used in 
the popular press. The popular use of botnet describes a 
set of physical computers, machines, that have been 
compromised by malicious software, a virus, that allows 
remote control of the machine. Often these botnets are 
used for spamming, phishing, distributed denial of 
service attacks (DDoS) or other nefarious activities. A 
relatively recent survey article on botnets covers the 
research literature that focuses largely on these cyber-
security aspects of bots and botnets [14], but also 
contains some valuable nuggets related to our focus on 
bots as social actors. 
Our definition is closer to the conceptualization of early 
Internet bots as social entities that would populate IRC 
(internet relay chat), or MUDs (multi-user domains). 
Our definition can cover the current botnets involved in 
                                                          
1. Astroturfing is a fake “grassroots”, populist, 
campaign in a social media space. This is named after a 
astroturfing1, as well as the range of social and 
informational uses. We take analytical stance that botnet 
activities could be deemed good or bad, depending on 
the social context and the types of actions that the bots 
take. In our view, ASAs are merely another part of the 
online social space with which we, as humans, must 
understand and interact. 
In the context of CSCW, understanding bots and the way 
bots work will directly influence the way we think about 
the design of collaboration systems and how we analyze 
the subsequent social activities that occur within those 
systems. As bots become part of collaborative systems, 
an effective analysis should be able to differentiate 
“real” human participation from that of bots, 
necessitating more sophisticated means of detecting 
social and collaborative activities of bots and bot 
networks. 
STUDYING SOCIAL BOTS AND BOTNETS 
Bots themselves are not a particularly new phenomena. 
In fact, some of the earliest bots and botnets were social 
bots; ASAs. In the following section we review related 
literature on social bots. We structure our review around 
the social infrastructures in which bots have 
participated; Internet Relay Chat (IRC), Multi-User 
Domains (MUDs), Massive Multiplayer Online Games 
(MMOGs) and ending with contemporary social 
computing systems. 
Bots on Internet Relay Chat (IRC) 
Far before ASAs began invading our current social 
network systems like Facebook or Twitter, they 
populated IRC. One of the earliest known IRC bots, 
Eggdrop, emerged as early as 1993 [16]. This bot could 
be configured to provide a range of triggered actions that 
helped administer IRC channels. The slightly social 
aspects of the bot include welcoming and greeting new 
participants and warnings for some user actions. There 
have been many bots developed for IRC, with ever 
increasing social sophistication. One reason that bots 
were traditionally popular on IRC was due to the 
simplicity of implementation and ability of scaling IRC 
[11]. 
A majority of the studies on IRC bots and botnets have 
focused on detection techniques, tracking and 
characterizing botnets. Abu Rajab et al. [1] used a 
multifaceted approach to track and capture the behavior 
of IRC based botnets. The study revealed a number of 
behavioral and structural features of IRC botnets, for 
example, the authors identified different scanning 
mechanisms (e.g., uniform, non-uniform, and localized 
scanning algorithms) botnets used to target its victims. 
type of fake field turf (fake grass) that was created in the 
1960s. 
In particular, the authors tracked 192 unique IRC botnets 
during the three months measurement period and 
concluded that botnets are generally “long-lived” in 
reference to the average lifetime of 47 days. In our study, 
we were able to capture a live botnet and actively track 
its behavior over more than six months until it was shut 
down, which adds an interesting case study of an 
exceptionally long-lived botnet. On botnet size, the 
authors conclude that it is highly likely that the botnet 
footprint is greater than the node size, which confirms 
the need to understand and follow this phenomenon on 
social networks to reduce potential negative impacts and 
raise awareness about its implications for the social 
graph. 
Mobs in Multi-User Domains (MUDs & MMOGs) 
The advent of Multi-User Dungeons (also Domains) 
(MUDs) included the need for automated social agents 
(ASAs) to enrich the playing experience. These mobs 
(mobiles) were not simply passive monsters that players 
could kill for experience points. Mobs were towns’ 
people, shopkeepers, bards, and government officials 
who had their own (programmed) motives and goals. 
Players could learn about the environment and progress 
the game through interaction with mobs. But as well, 
mobs could play key roles regulating the social 
environment of the game [2,11]. In World of Warcraft 
(WoW) mobs often shared state and comprised a very 
simple botnet. Despite solid studies on the social aspects 
of gaming, little work has focused on the specific social 
roles played by the mobs (bots) themselves.  
With the rapid growth of online gaming market (e.g., 
MMOGs such as WoW) came an increase in the use of 
unauthorized game bots [9,19]. These bots provided 
enhancements and triggering mechanisms for individual 
players often sitting in between the players’ client 
application and the game server. Some bots could 
effectively play the game completely in the players’ 
absence. These unauthorized bots were often considered 
a form of illegitimate play sabotaging game ecologies 
(i.e., amassing game currency, or experience points). 
Yamlolskiy and Govindaraju [19] articulate a typology 
of these types of game bots reflecting various genres of 
online games. In this MUD/MMOG space they 
articulate the idea of a botnet as a collection of bots 
which share information and coordinate to provide 
players who employ those bots a competitive advantage. 
The concept of federation or collusion among ASAs is 
important to our study. We leverage this botnet concept 
to understand how the ASAs in our study work together 
in their attempt to influence the direction and trending 
topics in an online social space. 
Bots in Contemporary Social Computing Systems 
The emergence of social botnets on social network 
systems (SNS) sparked interest amongst researchers to 
study this phenomenon and understand it is implications 
for the social sphere. In 2012, a report by Facebook 
estimated that 5-6% of all Facebook accounts are fake 
or bogus, which is considered a high percentage for 
Facebook as it means that approximately 50 million 
users are fake [14]. One study by Boshmaf et al. [3] 
discussed the use, impact, and implication of social bots 
on Facebook. In their research the authors designed and 
built a Socialbot Network (SbN) on Facebook to 
understand the ways in which social bots could threaten 
SNS by large-scale infiltration. The research focused on 
social bots that mimic human behavioral patterns to 
expose private information and destroy trust amongst 
users rather than bots that raise concerns through 
spamming. This research showed how vulnerable 
Facebook is to sophisticated social bots and how they 
can spread without being flagged by Facebook users and 
marked by the Facebook Immune System, which is a 
real-time system embedded in Facebook to protect its 
users and social graph from malicious spam [18]. 
The Web Ecology Project [19], called on researchers to 
participate in a competition to design social bots that 
have constructive impact on social networks to explore 
the different ways in which a social bot could influence 
online discourse. The results of this competition showed 
that social bots were able to reshape the social graph on 
Twitter by influencing and initiating some conversations 
with accounts that were not following each other 
previously. 
Other studies have considered the social implications of 
bots for the platforms where the bots interact. Geiger [8] 
elaborates the social roles surrounding bots in 
Wikipedia, but does not consider how bots interact 
socially with users within Wikipedia. 
While the research projects above explored the potential 
use cases of SNS based social botnets in general (in both 
positive and negative manners), we are particularly 
interested in the political use of social botnets. Recently, 
following the Arab Spring in 2010, SNS emerged as a 
political platform for activism. For example the 
dissemination of news, images and real-time videos 
from the streets of Egypt in 2011. The simplicity and 
receptivity of Twitter allows it to be used in many ways 
creatively by anyone online with good or bad motives. 
In this regard, a study by Ratkiewicz et al. [15] 
investigated how Twitter can be exploited through 
astroturfing campaigns. In their study the authors’ 
analyzed Twitter data that they obtained from an 
astroturfing detection tool named “Truthy”. They 
concluded that it is vital to detect the astroturfing 
campaigns before they go viral on Twitter because once 
they pass the first stages of detection by Twitter’s spam 
detector it is easy to abuse and spread misinformation 
that can result in a false sense of broad agreement. 
THE SYRIAN SOCIAL BOTNET (SSB) 
The related work suggests that social botnets have far-
reaching implications and they are only getting more 
sophisticated in terms of scanning for victims and 
mimicking human behaviors. Much work has focused 
on automatic detection mechanisms [3, 15] but little has 
been done to understand the behaviors and 
characteristics of social botnets in social computing 
platforms. This paper aims to elaborate our 
understanding of the latter. 
We captured a Twitter based botnet, in the wild, based 
on hashtags related to the Syrian civil war in April 2012, 
which we call the Syrian social botnet (SSB). We 
tracked the SSB for more than six months during the 
ongoing civil war, from April to December 2012. In this 
paper we focus on the measurement of influence, 
structure and growth of the SSB. Additionally, we 
present the results of our content analysis on a collection 
of 3000+ English and Arabic tweet samples. To the best 
of our knowledge this is the first such study on this topic. 
Method: Discovering a Social Botnet 
We initially started a collection of tweets related to the 
Syrian civil war in April 2012, approximately one year 
after the earliest peaceful protests related to the war. We 
searched for terms related to Syria (the country) and the 
names of five major Syrian cities (Damascus, Aleppo, 
Idlib, Hama, Homs) using both the English and Arabic 
names for each city as well as the country. This initial 
dataset covers 18 months with between 150K and 500K 
tweets per day, and approximately equal proportions of 
English and Arabic tweets. We relied on retweet data to 
begin a social network analysis because that action is 
more indicative of attention to content of the tweet [4]. 
During that analysis we focused on the social structure 
of specific events during the Syrian civil war (e.g., 
Houla massacre on May 25, 2012, anniversary of 9/11 
attack, Damascus massacre on December 12, 2012). 
From those events we noticed recurring clusters of users 
retweeting each other (for an example see Figure 1). 
Those recurring clusters uncovered the botnet in this 
study. We examined clustering patterns and identified a 
set of 20 high-volume twitterers and their social 
connections based on retweet activity. Next, we traced 
the profile information and activities of each high-
volume Twitterer. We found that 17 accounts had been 
suspended and had stopped tweeting altogether on the 
same date and time; around 6:30 AM UTC, November 
                                                          
2. For Twitter data reporting, we are using a pseudonym 
to reduce searchability and enhance confidentiality.  
20, 2012. We examined the content of their last tweets 
and found that all of the suspended accounts were 
retweeting a unique news aggregator bot: @GB1.2 We 
conducted a preliminary analysis on the social structure 
around @GB1 and 17 suspended user accounts. 
Specifically, we snowballed the retweet connections 
backwards in time to identify 130 usernames, 
comprising a social botnet, which we named the Syrian 
social botnet (SSB).  
This study focuses principally on the 35 weeks that the 
botnet was active. We conducted a comprehensive 
analysis aimed at understanding (i) the growth and 
structure of the botnet over time, (ii) how the content of 
the botnet (in Arabic) differs from the content of regular 
users tweeting in Arabic or English, and lastly, (iii) how 
the botnet may have influenced the overall discussion. 
Growth and Structure of SSB 
We wanted to understand how the botnet grew and 
whether 130 bots all played the same role or whether 
they behaved differently over time. For each identified 
bot, we examined (a) the total number of tweets per 
week, (b) the total number of retweets per week, and (c) 
the total number of “bot-retweets” per week, which is 
the portion of retweets of other SSB bots. Upon 
examining these features, we graphed and analyzed the 
trend of bot behaviors over the 35 week period (see 
Figure 2). Each bot was classified into one of five 
categories based on distinct behavioral patterns: short-
lived bots, long-lived bots, generator bots, core bots and 
peripheral bots. 
Core bots are the Twitter user accounts that we consider 
as primary agents of the SSB (see Figure 2-D). They 
typically demonstrate the following behavioral patterns: 
First, core bots tweeted frequently. They normally 
generated more than 1600 tweets per week (M=1641), 
which is roughly a tweet every 6 minutes nonstop. 
Moreover, core bots accelerated their rates of tweeting 
as the weeks progressed. In particular, on week 28, the 
median rate of core bot’s tweeting reached 5733, which 
is roughly a tweet every 1.8 minutes (see Figure 1 and 
Figure 2). Second, roughly half of a core bot’s activity 
focused on retweeting (the ratio of bot-retweets to total 
tweets: M=0.4691). Particularly, a core bot would only 
retweet which was created by its fellow core bots in the 
SSB (the ratio of bot-retweets to total retweets: 
M=0.9909).  
During the 35 week period, the lifespan of core bots 
varied from 1 to 32 weeks (M=10). In particular, we 
identified 23 core bots that survived more than 25 weeks 
(M=28), and we marked them as long-lived bots (see 
Figure 2-C). Conversely, we identified 43 short-lived 
bots that survived less than 6 weeks (M=2) during the 
first 11 week period (see Figure 2-A). Long-lived bots 
and short-lived bots are sub types of core bots. 
Figure 1. Social network of week 28 (red=core bots and long 
lived bots; orange=peripheral bots; green=other twitterers). 
  
Peripheral bots, on the other hand, are potentially 
legitimate twitterers that we assume to be unwittingly 
complicit in the SSB by retweeting one or more tweets 
generated by the core bots. Legitimate users being lured 
and participating in the network is often observed in 
astroturfing [15], therefore, we expected that this would 
also happen in the SSB. Since their pattern of behavior 
is distinctly different from the core bots and since we 
cannot unequivocally verify that each of those accounts 
belong to a “real person,” we will call them peripheral 
bots as opposed to assuming they are actual human users 
(see Figure 2-E). In contrast to core bots, peripheral bots 
tweeted occasionally, normally generating no more than 
70 tweets per week (M=11). In addition, the ratio of bot-
retweets to total retweets was significantly lower for 
peripheral (M=0) compared to core bots. In other words, 
peripheral bots seldom retweeted the other bots in the 
SSB. While core bots temporarily stopped tweeting 
altogether on week 20 peripheral bots continued to tweet 
during that void (see Figure 2-F). We identified 15 
peripheral bots out of 130 bots total in the SSB.  
In addition, we identified one exceptional type of core 
bot, a generator bot (see Figure 2-B). The generator bot 
typically produced more than 2100 original tweets per 
week (M=2384.5, that is, constantly posting more than 
one tweet every 4 minutes). As opposed to typical core 
bots, the generator bot seldom retweeted anything (the 
ratio of bot-retweets to total tweets: M=0). However, 
this bot (@GB1) was heavily retweeted by the other core 
bots. Despite these atypical traits, we included the 
generator bot as a subset of core bots based on (a) its 
high tweeting frequency, and (b) its behavior on ceasing 
to tweet during the week 20 and after the week 33 
shutdown (see Figure 2-G).  
Overall, we observed continuous growth of the SSB 
over the 35 week period. On week 1, we observed only 
two active core bots. By week 28, however, the number 
increased to 64 core bots, and the SSB emerged as a 
predominant cluster shown on the general Syrian 
retweet network graph (see Figure 1). The SSB’s 
networking activity (including numbers of total tweets, 
retweets, and bot-retweets) gradually increased over 
time as well. In particular, the volume of SSB’s 
networking activity spiked on week 28. However, 
despite this immense volume, the SSB was not 
immediately shutdown. On week 33, which is five 
weeks after its peak, the SSB was suspended by Twitter. 
Unsurprisingly, a close parallel to this growing pattern 
is found in the SSB’s influence on general Twitter 
community (for details, see the Influence of SSB 
section). 
SSB Content Categories 
Another key question for understanding the SSB is how 
the content of the botnet differs from regular users 
tweeting about the Syrian civil war. We conducted a 
grounded content analysis of a random sample of tweets 
from English twitterers, Arabic twitterers, and the botnet 
(which tweets in Arabic) and compared the difference 
between these three types of tweets. 
We created a set of grounded categories in several 
rounds. In the first round we selected a little over 100 
tweets at random from the botnet. One coder (a native 
Arabic speaker), read through the tweets and proposed a 
draft coding manual. After that the research team met to 
discuss the codes, leading to a first revision of the initial 
set of codes. At the outset, two overarching coding 
categories were identified: Primary Code based on topic 
and Secondary Code based on geographical context. 
Initially, we started with a small number of primary 
codes and two context codes (local and international). 
The categories and tweet exemplars were then reviewed 
and discussed with native English speakers to clarify 
translational, colloquial, and structural issues in the 
proposed categories to make sure they could fit with 
English tweets. In a second round, we took a random 
selection of English and Arabic tweets to test and 
elaborate the categories from the first round. 
Primary codes 
Our efforts resulted in 13 primary code categories as 
follows: 
1.1. Opinion. Self-expressive remarks about the ongoing 
Syrian crisis, including (but not limited to): opinions 
typically based on personal analysis of the situation, 
patriotism, critique or criticism, rhetorical questions, 
jokes that people use to self-express and de-stress from 
the crisis, prayers for the people of Syria, and poems or 
similar attempts at artful expression. If the text of the 
tweet is an excerpt from a news article (i.e., that you can 
tell by viewing a link and reading the story), then the 
tweet should be coded “News”. 
1.2. Testimonial. Testimonial remarks based on personal 
experience of the Syrian civil war, including references 
to one’s family members, close friends and 
acquaintances. May link to amateur videos shot during 
the war (e.g., footage of a battle, funeral or aftermath). 
If a video link contains any institutional symbols such as 
a unit name or unit logo, that suggests persistent 
presentation of information relative to that unit, code as 
follows: (1) If the video conveys immediacy 
(“happening now”) then code as “Breaking News” 
instead of Testimonial; (2) If there is no immediacy (i.e., 
a montage of recorded events) then code as “News” 
instead of Testimonial. 
1.3. Conversation. Conversational remarks that are 
clearly part of a dialog between two or more people, 
which cannot otherwise be coded without having access 
to the whole conversation. One strong indicator is when 
a @username is first in the post. To test if a tweet falls 
in the Conversation category, remove the @username 
and judge whether the tweet could be coded into any 
other category. If without the @username it could fall 
into one of the existing categories, then the tweet should 
be coded as that category. If without the @username the 
tweet would be “Uncodeable” then code the tweet as 
“Conversation”. 
1.4. Breaking News. Breaking news, information, on the 
Syrian civil war, typically uses emphasized headings 
such as “URGENT”, “BREAKING NEWS”, 
“IMPORTANT”, and “NOTE” to indicate immediacy. 
Any tweet that is generated by a news aggregator type 
of user account, where the user account is labeled with 
some form of “breaking news” is coded here. Headings 
such as “emergency”, “help” or “please help”, are not 
coded here; these terms likely suggest “Mobilization of 
Resistance/Support” category. 
1.5. News. Tweets relating information about the Syrian 
civil war from an “objective”, third party, stance or that 
are clearly trying to carry an objective tone. Includes 
tweets from verified news accounts and news aggregator 
accounts. This category includes reports from NGOs 
and martyr (obituary) notices. If there is a link in the 
tweet and that link points to a news article from a 
reliable source which is either “analysis” of news or 
“editorial” about news, then the tweet is coded in this 
category. 
1.6. Mobilization of Resistance/Support. Tweets that 
make calls for organizing, meeting, protesting and 
gatherings related to the civil war. This includes online 
petitioning, retweet requests and related forms of 
slactivism. 
1.7. Mobilization for Assistance. Tweets mobilizing 
people and organizations for social and humanitarian aid 
such as donations of food, clothing, and money. 
1.8. Solicitation for Information. Tweets asking about 
the situation in Syria. Rhetorical questions about the 
civil war are coded as “Opinion”. 
1.9. Information Provisioning. Tweets that provide 
information that is individually actionable. 
1.10. Pop Culture. Tweets that reference celebrities, 
music, sports and entertainment and related people. 
1.11. Other. Tweets related to Syria and other countries, 
but not clearly associated with the civil war. 
1.12. Spam/Phishing. Tweets that look to be some form 
of spam or phishing. 
1.13. Uncodeable. Tweets in languages other than 
Arabic or English or too short to reasonably interpret 
and code in another category. 
Secondary codes 
Additionally, we developed the two code categories 
based on context. These codes are independent from the 
primary codes: 
2.1. Local Context. Tweets that mention the current 
situation in (and only in) Syria that is otherwise 
unspecified. Including: key events in Syria, elections, 
and military reaction. 
2.2. International Context. Tweets with any mentions of 
foreign countries surrounding Syria and international 
organizations such as UN and Amnesty International. 
This category includes mainly: reactions from other 
countries to the situation in Syria, mobilization in 
support for Syria in other countries and hashtags listing 
many foreign countries. 
These categories were developed based on an iterative 
exploration of samples of tweets, assumptions about the 
way a botnet might work, and what we have observed in 
Content Categories Botnet Arabic English 
News 538 
(52.6%) 
359 
(35.0%) 
376 
(37.6%) 
Other 325 
(31.8%) 
29 (2.8%) 39 (3.9%) 
Opinion 127 
(12.4%) 
465 
(45.3%) 
258 
(25.8%) 
Spam/Phishing 13 (1.3%) 10 (1.0%) 249 
(24.9%) 
Testimonial 0 (0.0%) 54 (5.3%) 14 (1.4%) 
Conversation 1 (0.1%) 23 (2.2%) 20 (2.0%) 
Breaking News 4 (0.4%) 47 (4.6%) 18 (1.8%) 
Mobilization of 
Resistance/Support 
3 (0.3%) 9 (0.9%) 7 (0.7%) 
Mobilization for Assistance 1 (0.1%) 4 (0.4%) 2 (0.2%) 
Solicitation for Information 1 (0.1%) 4 (0.4%) 1 (0.1%) 
Information Provisioning 2 (0.2%) 19 (1.9%) 12 (1.2%) 
Pop Culture 7 (0.7%) 3 (0.3%) 4 (0.4%) 
Total Tweets Coded 1022 1026 1000 
Uncodable (removed from 
analysis) 
26 11 207 
Table 1. Comparison of tweet content categories between SSB, 
regular Arabic and English twitter users. 
the prior literature. One assumption we had was that the 
botnet would attract attention through use of popular 
culture references, resulting in the Pop Culture category. 
Categories like our Information Provisioning category 
have been reported in crisis informatics research as a 
way that social media users have of swiftly finding 
rescue or aid [17]. As well, the Mobilization for 
Assistance and Mobilization of Resistance/Support 
categories are similar to content categories from 
research findings on the role that Internet-based 
technologies play within social mobilization and 
political processes [6]. In the case of Opinion and 
Testimonial categories, we noticed a difference between 
people commenting about other media, such as a photo, 
a video or a news article, and video footage or images 
that were most likely recorded by the twitterer himself. 
By distinguishing between first-person content and 
comments on others’ content we sought to offer a more 
nuanced analysis of differences in the botnet, Arabic and 
English content around this same event. 
We used a Cohen’s kappa to help measure our coding 
consistency over primary codes, which are independent 
from the secondary codes. Cohen’s kappa is one 
measure of inter-coder reliability. Values range from 
1.00 to -1.00, with 1.00 indicating perfect agreement and 
0.00 indicating agreement that is no better than chance 
[7,12]. Two commonly referenced benchmarks for 
interpreting the values of Cohen’s kappa are Fleiss, 
Levin & Paik [7] and Landis & Koch [12]. Cohen’s 
kappa was calculated for the two coders based on a 
random sample that of 120 English tweets. Our sample 
was generated from English tweets only due to difficulty 
in finding a second fluent Arabic speaker. The overall 
score was k=0.64, indicating “intermediate to good” or 
“substantial” agreement by the respective benchmarks. 
We had better agreement in a few categories (News, 
k=0.74; Spam/Phishing, k=0.75) and poorer agreement 
in a few categories (Other, k=0.49; Opinion, k=0.50). 
But overall, the agreement between the two coders for 
this qualitative coding was relatively high.  
Content Analysis: SSB vs. English and Arabic  
The coding process considered the content of the tweet, 
the content at the end of any link or URL in the tweet, 
and the username of the account as appropriate. In cases 
where the content at the end of a link had been removed, 
taken down or made private and unviewable, then the 
coding decision was based on the content and username 
alone. 
Next, we generated three random samples of tweets; a 
little over 1000 tweets each from Arabic, English and 
SSB. Retweets were excluded from these three samples. 
The random samples were generated in multiple rounds 
of between 100-200 tweets each. The goal was to have 
at least 1000 coded tweets from each of the three 
categories, excluding any tweets from the total which 
fell into the “Uncodeable” category. A native Arabic 
speaker coded both the SSB and Arabic tweet samples. 
The English tweets were coded by a different coder. The 
team discussed difficult and troublesome tweets in each 
round to come to a consensus code for the most difficult 
tweets. 
Table 1 illustrates a number of interesting content 
differences between the tweets by the SSB, regular 
Arabic twitter users and regular English twitter users. 
Table 1 also includes the number of tweets that we coded 
as Uncodeable. This number was quite high in the 
English sample because in that set there are many tweets 
that use English terms or hashtags that are names of 
Syrian cities, but which are actually in another foreign 
language. For instance, the term “hama” stands out 
significantly as a Latin character term that often 
accompanies tweets in Japanese. 
One should immediately notice that a little more than 
half of the tweets by the SSB are News, whereas for 
regular users (both Arabic and English) News only 
comprised a little over one third of the total. It is useful 
to keep in mind that this analysis does not include 
retweets, so these tweets are often some representations 
of a news story or an attempt to report or describe events 
in an objective tone. In the case of the SSB, we noticed 
that many News tweets led to one of three particular 
websites all linked to the Syrian Arab news agency 
(SANA), which is an official reporting source for the 
Syrian government. Here is an example: 
#Syria http://t.co/fEsxv6wH news reporter in Idlib: 
armed terrorist groups hijacked four units of the public 
order brigade at Bab Alhawa checkpoint #Syria  
 رصانع فطتخت هحلسم هيباهرإ تاعومجم :بلدا يف هيرابخلإا لسارم
 ايروس# يدودحلا ىوهلا باب ىلع ماظنلا ظفح
http://t.co/fEsxv6wH 
In contrast, News tweets from regular Arabic and 
English twitterers included links from a wide range of 
sources, such as Al-Arabiya, Al-Jazeera, BBC, or 
Washington Post. Here is an example: 
“Alarabiya.net”published scary pictures of A’zaz 
massacre in Aleppo http://t.co/zlwkuQ6Q #Al-Arabiya 
#Syria 
 بلح يف زازعا ةرزجمل هبعرم اروص رشنت "تن.هيبرعلا"
http://t.co/zlwkuQ6Q  ايروس# هيبرعلا# 
Another major difference crosses the Opinion category. 
This was the most significant category for Arabic 
twitterers at about 45% of their tweets. In reading the 
tweets we see that many Arabic twitterers had strong 
opinions about what was happening on the ground in 
Syria and they used Twitter to express themselves. 
Many expressed shock at how the situation evolved 
toward a civil war. In addition, due to strong religious 
sentiments across the Middle East, many were sharing 
prayers and requesting prayers for the victims of the 
civil war. Here is an example: 
Oh gracious lord.. Whoever is in your charge shall never 
be humiliated please extend victory to your army in 
Syria and show us in the near future the end of Bashar 
… Lord … No one from the Arabs and non-Arabs 
tyrannize like him…Lord with your ability let him perish 
#Syria  
لا بيرقلاف انرأ ... كدنج رصن كيلع زعي لا نماي ميركاي برااااااااي لجاع
 كتردقب براي هلثم مجعلا و برعلا نم غطي مل براي ... راشب حافسلا ةياهن
هكلها ايروس#  
The frequency of English tweets that we classified as 
Opinion (25.8%) was lower than that of Arabic tweets, 
but still the second largest category. This suggests that 
English twitterers had similarly strong opinions about 
the civil war. Lastly, Opinion tweets from the SSB were 
fewer still at 12.4%. 
Another standout difference is in the frequency of spam 
and phishing content. It appears that in the English-
speaking world it is common to use major events to 
attract attention to sales, product marketing, or phishing. 
About 25% of the English tweet content related to some 
form of spam/phishing, attempting to leverage interest 
in the Syrian civil war to gain attention. 
Another major difference between the SSB and the 
Arabic and English tweets was in the category Other. 
For the SSB this category comprised 31.8% of the 
content: tweets still associated with Syria, but not clearly 
related to the conflict. Since the volume was notably 
high among the SSB, we decided to unpack this category 
for the SSB tweets only. We checked the distribution of 
its secondary codes: International context (59%) was 
somewhat higher than Local context (41%). The sub-
category “Other-Local” encompasses the tweets that 
contain local news about Syria that are not conflict 
related, for example:  
#Syria Ministry of Education: 13,500 new jobs within 
the employment program for youth http://t.co/tLAugGrb 
#vqk 
# ايروس :ةيبرتلا ةرازو13،500  جمانرب نمض ةديدج لمع ةصرف
 بابشلا فيظوت http://t.co/tLAugGrb#vqk  
The link in the tweet discusses the plans for an 
employment program but does not mention the ongoing 
conflict in the region. This is one of many similar tweets 
that include news about meetings happening between 
government officials that do not mention the ongoing 
war in Syria. The volume of these tweets show how 
social botnets can influence the online discussion by 
covering up tweets related to the main event, in other 
words, by smoke screening.  
In contrast, the sub-category “Other-International” 
encompasses tweets that contain news, facts, and any 
other topic from outside Syria that is not related to the 
war. An example of this:  
#Syria BBC… Accused of covering up sexual assaults! 
http://t.co/pvEVLhOq #pil 
 ةمهتم يس يب يبلا ةانق ... ِيسنجلا ءادتعلاا هيطغت يف
http://t.co/pvEVLhOq #pil ايروس# 
The link in the tweet directed to Syria Steps, a Syrian 
pro-regime website and one of the three frequently 
linked to websites by the SSB. The article discusses the 
news of the English DJ and BBC television presenter 
Jimmy Savile, who committed sexual abuse, which is 
not related to Syria. In general, the result of our analysis 
in the SSB’s “Other” category shows that one of the SSB 
goals may have been to flood the hashtag #Syria with 
irrelevant topics to distract focus from the civil war, in 
other words, by misdirecting. We will return to more 
details about smoke screening and misdirection in the 
Discussion section. 
Influence of SSB 
Our last research question was how the SSB might have 
influenced the discussion on Twitter regarding the 
Syrian civil war. We decided to consider the top 100 
most retweeted tweets for each week of the dataset. We 
then considered how many tweets the SSB was able to 
get into the top 100 and what rank those tweets achieved 
as a basic measure of the potential influence of the 
botnet. It is fair to note that the SSB tweets are in Arabic 
and our analysis here covers the full 35 weeks of botnet 
dataset, which includes a significant number of English 
tweets. Thus, the SSB may have had more influence 
among Arabic Twitter users. Still, given the terms used 
to collect the dataset our analysis can start to show what 
it takes for a social botnet to begin to have influence. 
Figure 3 illustrates the trend of growing influence of the 
SSB over the 35 week period. Each week we identified 
all the tweets in the top 100 most retweeted. We then 
calculated a botnet influence score based on two 
metrics: (a) rank influence (the sum of ranked positions 
of bot retweets in the top 100) and (b) RT influence (a 
magnitude of retweet cascade represented by the sum of 
frequencies of bot retweets in the top 100). These graphs 
reveal a number of interesting characteristics. First, the 
activity of the botnet is quite “underground” during the 
first third of its lifespan, apparently having no influence 
in the top 100 most retweeted content. In the second 
third it begins to have some influence; but the most 
significant influence does not occur until the very end, 
when the total number of bots in the botnet is highest 
and the frequency of tweeting by each bot is 
superhumanly high.  
We performed a content analysis of all the SSB tweets 
that made the top 100 for each week using the same 
content categories developed above. Like the bulk of the 
human tweets, the top three categories were News, 
Other, and Opinion, with slight differences in 
percentage distribution that could simply be a function 
of the smaller number of tweets that the botnet was able 
to push up into the top 100 most retweeted tweets each 
week. That the ratios are similar, suggests the SSB was 
not discriminating among the tweets that it would 
attempt to push up through high frequency retweeting.  
For example, in week 29, which was one of the intensely 
active weeks for the SSB (see Figure 3 and Figure 4), a 
tweet generated by the bot @LL1 shot up to 4th place in 
the top 100 most retweeted tweet rankings: 
Media Reporter Hosein Mortada: "Who assassinated 
General Hassan and a few asked questions: 
http://t.co/OmagQsV4 #Syria  
ضترم نيسح يملاعلاا:"ةحورطم ةلئسأو نسحلا لتاق":ى 
 http://t.co/OmagQsV4ايروس# 
This tweet got retweeted 1041 times by the SSB user 
accounts only. Another tweet generated by the bot 
@CB7 mentions the same journalist and reporter Hosein 
Mortada. This tweet was retweeted 730 times and 
ranked 12th in week 28 with only the SSB retweeting it: 
The Morning Gate news: the #Lebanese reporter 
Hussein Morteza told "The Morning Gate": Hezbollah 
has nothing to do with the killing in #Syria.... 
http://t.co/wW88DdfL #Syria 
 يضترم نيسح ينانبل# لا يملاعلإا:ةيرابخلاا حابصلا ةباوب
 لتقمب ايروس# و الله بزحل ةقلاع لا:"حابصلا"ـل
...http://t.co/wW88DdfL  ايروس# 
Further analysis shows that the link in each tweet directs 
to a news article from Al-Sabah (which means “The 
Morning”), which seems to be an Egyptian news portal.  
Additionally, as part of understanding how the SSB 
influence grew over time, we considered who else was 
retweeting SSB tweets. We computed the ratio of 
retweeting between SSB accounts and regular accounts 
for the top 100 most retweeted tweets. This revealed that 
15 tweets out of the 181 SSB tweets that made it in to 
the top 100 were retweeted by accounts likely in control 
of a real user (in addition to massive retweeting by the 
SSB). This is an important finding because it confirms 
that the SSB’s intensive activity got attention from 
regular twitter users.  
We looked closely at all 15 tweets that got retweeted by 
humans and coded them using our coding scheme. 
 
Figure 3. Influence of the SSB on Twitter RT space.  
 
Figure 4. Number of bots entering the weekly top 100 RT chart.  
Similar to the bulk of human tweets, the 15 tweets were 
within the top two categories News and Opinion. 
Interestingly, the ones that received the largest amount 
of retweeting by human accounts were in the Opinion 
category, which is a category where the SSB was not 
very active, but humans were. This shows the SSB was 
able to garner human attention through topics that mirror 
or mimic humans interest. An example of an Opinion 
tweet that was mostly retweeted by humans:  
This image made me laugh a lot as it shows Arabs 
activists participation in #Syria liberating… And in 
#Bahrain terrorist http://t.co/UyOlqYzl #Syria  
ينتكحضأ هذه  يف يرجي ام نأ حضوت برع نيطشانل اريثك هروصلا
وث ايروس#ر# يف و هنيرحبلا باهرإ http://t.co/UyOlqYzl 
Although the link attached to this tweet is broken, 
conducting a simple Google search reveals it used to 
point to a political cartoon. We then computed the ratio 
of human to SSB retweets for this specific tweet and 
found that 237 human accounts retweeted it in 
comparison to 1043 bot accounts, which is an indicator 
of some human attention. 
DISCUSSION 
In this paper we aimed at answering three main 
questions regarding one specific social bot network on 
Twitter: to understand how it grows over time, how the 
content of tweets by the social botnet differ from regular 
users in the same dataset, and lastly, how the social 
botnet may have influenced the relevant discussions. 
Our analysis revealed some interesting findings that 
sometimes contradict and sometimes support current 
knowledge on social botnets. 
Mimicking human behaviors 
The prior literature on social bots suggests that social 
bots thrive and succeed by mimicking human behavior 
on social networks. By mimicking human behavior, bots 
can go unnoticed and improve their chances of 
impacting the social graph. The results of our qualitative 
coding showed that the SSB did not work to mimic 
human behavior whatsoever. Our analysis shows that 
over half of the SSB tweets (52.6%) were in the News 
category, while human tweets (in both English and 
Arabic) are only about one-third News – a large and very 
detectable difference. Further in the opposite direction, 
humans are likely to have a large proportion of their 
content expressing some personal opinion about an 
event (45% for our Arabic sample and 25% for our 
English sample). Based on the data, the SSB does not 
seem to have much in the way of an opinion about what 
was happening in Syria, especially when compared to 
other Arabic language twitterers. 
This insight raises two problems with regard to the way 
the prior work has described and presented ASAs. First 
is the suggestion that ASAs are becoming sophisticated 
in construction. Our analysis suggests that this ASA did 
very little to mimic the activity of a human across both 
the types of content and the frequency of tweeting 
activity. While there may be some value in mimicking 
human activity it may not be completely worth the effort 
depending on the goals of the ASA operators. We point 
out that the content most similar to human content was 
a bit more likely to be retweeted by actual people, but 
the main question remains.  
Secondly, there is a notion that an ASA that mimics 
human behavior is less detectable. The SSB that we 
studied was live for over six months. The frequency of 
tweeting and the connectedness of the retweet social 
network are what allowed us to identify the bots in the 
network. While we do not actually know when Twitter 
detected this specific botnet, we know specifically when 
Twitter disabled the associated accounts. The challenges 
for botnet detection are multiple. Determining the 
motives and legitimacy of the botnet are important. If 
the botnet is supporting the community, disabling it may 
be a bad idea. Another challenge is determining how 
wide a net to cast around the botnet. From our data it 
seems clear that casting a wide net would include a 
number of real users who probably would not realize 
they were part of a botnet simply as a function of their 
retweeting and following behaviors. Bot and botnet 
detection is not currently conceptualized as an obvious 
CSCW topic. But as bots and botnets become 
participants in larger and more complex social 
computing systems the relevance to CSCW will grow 
and what CSCW researchers have to contribute will 
become more important. 
Misdirection and Smoke Screening 
We observed two distinct tactics that the SSB used to 
point attention away from relevant information (about 
the Syrian civil war) and influence perception: 
misdirection and smoke screening. Misdirection is a 
technique that magicians use to get the audience to look 
somewhere else when completing a trick. Similarly, an 
ASA network that tries to get the audience to attend to 
other content is using misdirection. In contrast, a smoke 
screen serves to hide or provide cover for or obscure 
some type of activity. When the volume of a botnet 
campaign is high enough with unrelated content, the 
unrelated content can effectively hide real content.  
In the case of our SSB’s tweets, many tweets embedded 
in the Other category were related to foreign news, in 
particular, political and natural crises happening 
worldwide. For example, the SSB was benefiting from 
the political unrest happening in the Kingdom of 
Bahrain and tweeting news updates on the Bahraini 
situation: 
Pan Ki-moon » calls #Bahraini regime to lift the 
restrictions on public demonstrations 
http://t.co/UfMEIPzG #glu #Syria 
# ايروس#Syria «نوم يك » نع دويقلا عفرل ينيرحبلا# ماظنلا وعدي
 ةيبعشلا تارهاظملا#glu http://t.co/UfMEIPzG 
Another example is posting photos of New Jersey and 
New York damaged by Hurricane Sandy on the east 
coast of the United States.  
Hurricane Sandy Is currently almost 380 miles from 
New York and is expected to arrive after 5 hours from 
now http://t.co/mzrexObC #Syria 
 ًايلاح دعبي يدناس_راصعا٣٨٠ بيرقت ليم هلوصو عقوتيو كرويوين نع ًا
 دعب٥  نلأا نم تاعاسhttp://t.co/mzrexObC ايروس# 
The prevalence of these posts, which were tagged with 
our collection terms, but seemingly have little to do with 
the actual events in Syria look to be calculated 
misdirection, pointing viewers specifically toward other 
unrelated events. Specifically the SSB was attempting to 
get people looking for tweets on Syria to pay attention 
to something major that is happening elsewhere. 
This behavior is distinctly different from the way smoke 
screening is commonly perceived. A few bloggers and 
news sources such as The Guardian have raised attention 
to smoke screening on Twitter, describing it as “a cabal 
of pro-regime accounts, set up for the sole purpose of 
flooding the #Syria hashtag and overwhelming the pro-
revolution narrative” [21].  
In the case of the SSB, the remaining tweets embedded 
in the Other categories were clearly related to events in 
Syria, just not always related to the civil war. For 
example: 
#Syria 25 short films will be produced by the General 
Organization for Cinema as part of the 2013 plan to 
support youth cinema http://t.co/PN2cCEYN#goq # 
Syria 
 ايروس#٢٥  عورشم نمض امنيسلل ةماعلا ةسسؤملا هجتنتس ًاريصق ًامليف
 ماعلل بابشلا امنيس معد2013 http://t.co/PN2cCEYN #goq 
ايروس# 
This work and the examples we have provided begin to 
highlight the shades of difference between misdirection 
and smoke screening as useful techniques to influence 
social media attention.  
Although a full elaboration is out of the scope of this 
study, it is worth mentioning that misdirection and 
smoke screening are distinct from astroturfing. The 
common description of astroturfing is to use a set of 
ASAs to tweet or retweet a particular point of view to 
suggest broad consensus around that view. Misdirection 
and smoke screening rely on other, potentially irrelevant 
ideas, as opposed to contesting ideas, and tweets or 
retweets those ideas suggesting that the audience should 
find those ideas more interesting. 
News reporting 
Throughout the coding stage, the Arabic and English 
coders were comparing notes and discussing differences 
between the three samples: SSB, Arabic, and English. 
As expected, there were clear differences in the News 
category between English and Arabic tweets, which 
seem related to differences in language and cultural 
traditions. However, we were not expecting to see the 
notable difference between Arabic news reporting and 
the SSB news reporting as they are both in Arabic. In the 
latter, the main difference was the frequent use of strong 
language in the SSB tweets about the opposition, the 
Free Syrian Army (FSA), and countries that support the 
FSA, by frequently calling them terrorists and posting 
torture videos. Here are two examples: 
#Syria http://t.co/fEsxv6wH news reporter in Idlib: 
armed terrorist groups hijacked four units of the public 
order brigade at Bab Alhawa checkpoint #Syria 
Qaeda member Maen Alrez death moment in Homs 
#Syria #Bahrain #syria #Homs 
http://t.co/FhFJBwaU #ايروس 
Lifespan model 
One of the popular conceptualizations about social 
media botnets is that they explode onto the social scene 
and immediately influence social media discussions. 
However, the lifespan model of the SSB was somewhat 
different. The botnet was not built in a day: tracking the 
SSB for 35 weeks, we observed two distinct stages of its 
growth. In the earlier stage, from Week 1 to 13, the 
behavioral patterns appear to be fuzzy and irregular (see 
Figure 1). It is likely that the SSB operators were 
experimenting with prototypes, in particular, the 43 
short-lived bots whose median lifespan was only two 
weeks. After Week 14, however, the pattern begins to 
stabilize. After Week 14 the median lifespan increased 
to 28 weeks and the median total tweets per week 
increased to 3449. Interestingly, Week 14 is the same 
week when the generator bot (@GB1) first started to 
tweet. We suspect that @GB1 played pivotal role in 
systematizing the SSB. By looking closer at @GB1’s 
tweet contents, we found a peculiar hashtag, which is a 
combination of three random letters (e.g., #wqz, #hzf, 
and so on), attached at the end of each tweet generated 
by @GB1. We assume that these hashtags may be some 
kind of identification code for the tweets but do not 
know the exact use. These random letter hashtags 
require further investigation. 
CONCLUSION 
This study aimed to understand the behaviors and 
characteristics of social botnets on social computing and 
social media platforms. We have presented the results of 
the three analyses we conducted on the dataset of tweets 
in which the Syrian social botnet was discovered. The 
results of the three analyses we conducted on the data 
set aimed at answering three questions: (i) How did the 
SSB grew over time, (ii) how the content of the botnet 
(in Arabic) differs from the content of regular users 
tweeting in Arabic or English, and lastly, (iii) how the 
botnet may have influenced the overall Syrian civil war 
discussion. Our results revealed several new and 
interesting findings. 
As social computing systems grow in sophistication and 
popularity, bots and collections of bots will take ever 
more important roles. The collective efforts of 
individual bots are already critical to supporting 
Wikipedia [8]. As bots become more social and as they 
federate in to networks of collective activity, it is 
essential for designers and researchers to anticipate and 
design for the interactions between bots and human 
participants. This work helps set the stage for that by 
characterizing what is currently happening in the space 
of social botnets in a specific social media system, 
Twitter. 
Our findings identified a number of differences between 
what we observed and the way botnets are portrayed in 
the prior literature. In this paper, we discussed how the 
SSB in our study was exceptionally long-lived 
compared to the life span of other reported botnets. This 
could be due to the fact that the SSB in our study was 
tweeting in Arabic. This result suggests that there is 
room for research on the effective detection of social 
botnets in social media. In addition, from our qualitative 
coding, it is not clear that the SSB was actually trying to 
mimic and replicate human behavior. Instead, it seemed 
mostly interested in flooding Syrian civil war related 
hashtags with topics that are not war related. That is 
different from what have been previously discussed in 
the literature on social bots.  
There is an opportunity to continue expanding on this 
study to answer questions we had during our research. 
For example, what were the topics the SSB focused on 
to distract attention from the Syrian civil war? How can 
the results of this research help increase awareness to 
this phenomenon and teach SNS users on the dangers of 
social botnets? In addition, we believe that the results of 
this work will have a positive impact on the research 
being conducted on more sophisticated detection 
software on SNS. 
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